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Report No.
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Investigation of the concept of detection of diversion in IAEA safeguards

Akiba, Mitsunori*

Nuclear material accountancy begins with the nuclear material accounting activities which are undertaken by facility operators. These activities and corresponding accounting information generated are verified through independent inspections. For bulk handling facilities, two diversion strategies, diversion into D and diversion into MUF, could be assumed. These diversion strategies have to be detected by inspectorate quantitatively. Inspection goals, that is, significant quantities, detection time and detection probability is set in advance. Based on the detction goal amounts, sample sizes are calculated for gross defect, partial defect and bias defects testers. Major defects could be detected by these three verificatuin testers, this is called Item-D statistics.Remaining of major defects which is small defects could be detected by Material Balance-D statistics. Diversion into MUF could be detcted by MUF statistics. Overall detection capabilities are the combination of these three statistics.

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