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Safety margins after failure of fuel cladding during protected loss-of-heat-sink accidents in a sodium-cooled fast reactor

ナトリウム冷却高速炉における崩壊熱除去機能喪失事象時の被覆管破損後の安全余裕

深野 義隆  ; 西村 正弘 ; 山田 文昭

Fukano, Yoshitaka; Nishimura, Masahiro; Yamada, Fumiaki

ナトリウム冷却高速炉の日本の原型炉における設計基準事故では、以下の炉心損傷の判断基準が用いられている。(a)燃料が溶融しないこと、(b)燃料被覆管が破損しないよう、被覆管最高温度が830$$^{circ}$$C未満であること、(c)冷却材が沸騰しないこと。一方、設計基準外事故やシビアアクシデント(SA)においては、被覆管破損は許容されるが、炉心の冷却が維持され、燃料が溶融しないことが要求される。崩壊熱除去機能喪失(PLOHS)事象はSAの最も支配的な重要事故シーケンスの一つであり、本研究では、PLOHS時に燃料被覆管の破損を仮定した場合の炉心の著しい損傷に対する安全余裕について検討した。最新知見のレビュー結果から、下記の3つが炉心の著しい損傷に至るメカニズムとして抽出された。(1)燃料ナトリウム反応生成物の形成に伴う燃料溶融、(2)隣接ピンからのジェット状のガス放出による除熱低下、(3)同ジェット状のガス放出による機械的負荷。これらのメカニズムをFUCAコードに組込み、解析評価した結果、少なくとも、冷却材温度が950$$^{circ}$$Cに至るまでは、炉心の著しい損傷に至らないことを明らかにした。すなわち、PLOHS時に被覆管が破損しても、炉心の著しい損傷に至るまで大きな安全余裕があることがわかった。

The following safety criteria for anticipated operational occurrences are commonly and uniformly employed for all the DBAs in the Japanese prototype sodium-cooled fast reactor to prevent fuel melting and cladding failure:(a) Maximum fuel temperature shall be below the melting point,(b) Maximum cladding temperature shall be below 830$$^{circ}$$C, and (c) Maximum coolant temperature shall be below the boiling point. Cladding failure is allowed, on the contrary to that, in beyond DBAs (BDBAs) or severe accidents (SAs), whereas the core cooling capability is also needed to be secured as in DBAs. No fuel melting enables this by keeping the core in a coolable geometry, and is thus conservatively required even under such a condition. Protected loss-of-heat-sink (PLOHS) events are identified as one of the most dominant sequences. Safety margins for significant core damage in PLOHS events were therefore studied in this paper assuming fuel cladding failure. The following three possible mechanisms leading to degradation of the core were then identified to be scrutinized by a thorough and state-of-the-art review of open papers on the phenomena anticipated to occur under cladding failure conditions:(1) Fuel melting due to fuel-sodium reaction product (FSRP) formation, (2) Thermal transient due to FP gas impingement from adjacent failed fuel pins, and (3) Mechanical load due to the same FP gas impingement. It was clarified through simulation analyses on each phenomenon mentioned above using the FUCA code that there was no significant core damage at the coolant temperatures of up to 950$$^{circ}$$C. It was therefore concluded that large safety margins are provided during PLOHS events even in failure of fuel cladding.

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