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Tamai, Hiroshi; Okubo, Ayako; Kimura, Yoshiki; Kokaji, Lisa; Shinohara, Nobuo; Tomikawa, Hirofumi
Dai-37-Kai Kaku Busshitsu Kanri Gakkai Nihon Shibu Nenji Taikai Rombunshu (CD-ROM), 8 Pages, 2017/02
Nuclear Forensics capability has been developed under the international collaborations. For its effective function, technical development in analysis of seized nuclear materials as well as the institutional development in comprehensive response framework are required under individual national responsibility. In order to keep the "chain of custody" in the proper operation of sample collection at the event scene, radiological analysis at the laboratory, storage of the samples, and further inspection and trial, close cooperation and information sharing between relevant organisations are essential. IAEA issues the Implementing Guide to provide the model action plan and assists individual national development. International cooperation for the technical improvement and awareness cultivation is promoted. Examples in such national developments will be introduced and prospective technical/institutional prerequisite for nuclear forensics response framework will be studied.
Tazaki, Makiko; Iwamoto, Tomonori*; Suda, Kazunori; Shimizu, Ryo; Tamai, Hiroshi; Kokaji, Lisa
Dai-37-Kai Kaku Busshitsu Kanri Gakkai Nihon Shibu Nenji Taikai Rombunshu (CD-ROM), 9 Pages, 2017/02
As to states determination on physical protection measures of nuclear material and nuclear facilities against unauthorized removal of nuclear material, International Atomic Energy (IAEA) makes recommendation of states to follow a Table which sets out three different categories-based physical protection measures. Primary factors of such categories are isotope, quantity and radiation of nuclear material. On the other hand, in the US, attractiveness of nuclear material including physical form and degree of dilution of special nuclear material (SNM) are also primary determining factors of physical protection measures, in addition to IAEAs primary factors. Focusing on SMN within radioactive waste, authors carried out a study on optimization of physical protection measures for the radioactive waste, using the IAEA Implementing Guide and the US regulations as references.
Tamai, Hiroshi; Tazaki, Makiko; Kokaji, Lisa; Shimizu, Ryo; Suda, Kazunori
Kaku Busshitsu Kanri Gakkai (INMM) Nihon Shibu Dai-36-Kai Nenji Taikai Rombunshu (Internet), 7 Pages, 2015/12
In recent years the promotion of nuclear security culture aiming at strengthening nuclear security is extensively mentioned, however, awareness of nuclear security culture seems to be not much high compared to the permeation of nuclear safety culture. As a world's leading country of peaceful nuclear use, permeation of nuclear security culture into each personnel attitude must be one of important issues in Japan. Learning from the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident, complementarity between nuclear safety and nuclear security in the aspect of both protection measures has been profoundly recognised. Therefore, it will be natural to promote nuclear security culture modelled on the preceding nuclear safety culture. On this standpoint, the paper examines an approach for the promotion of nuclear security culture which, for example, consists of awareness cultivation, attitude progress, permeation assessment, and resulting in the establishment of PDCA Cycle.
Shimizu, Ryo; Tazaki, Makiko; Kokaji, Lisa; Tamai, Hiroshi; Suda, Kazunori
Kaku Busshitsu Kanri Gakkai (INMM) Nihon Shibu Dai-36-Kai Nenji Taikai Rombunshu (Internet), 6 Pages, 2015/12
On 14 July 2015, E3/EU+3 and Iran reached final agreement on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding Iran's nuclear program. Iran is now allowed to purse peaceful use of nuclear energy including uranium enrichment under certain pre-agreed conditions. From now on, IAEA inspection subjected to the agreed JCPOA will be further applied. Although Iran has not yet ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol (AP) to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, it now provisionally applies the AP and consequently the IAEA is able to access every nuclear related facilities in Iran including not only uranium mines, but also any places and facilities which have been suspected to relate to nuclear weapon activities. In addition, the JCPOA introduces a new system of monitoring procurement of nuclear related materials and services by Iran. In the study, together with Iran's previous nuclear activities and outline of the JCPOA, various IAEA Safeguards activities in nuclear facilities in Iran and its challenges are analysed.
Kokaji, Lisa; Suda, Kazunori; Tamai, Hiroshi; Tazaki, Makiko; Shimizu, Ryo
Kaku Busshitsu Kanri Gakkai (INMM) Nihon Shibu Dai-36-Kai Nenji Taikai Rombunshu (Internet), 7 Pages, 2015/12
After the Cold War, the United States and Russia have been decreasing the number of nuclear warheads under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and other agreements, with step-by step removal from nuclear military programs under the process of nuclear disarmament. In 2000, the two states signed the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA), which prescribes each of them to dispose of at least 34 metric tons of plutonium. Recently, since the cost of constructing the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fabrication Facility has increased significantly, the United States has been assessing alternatives. In the revised PMDA, which defines weapon-grade plutonium as "an isotopic ratio of plutonium 240 to plutonium 239 of no more than 0.10", Article VII states, "Each Party shall have the right to conduct and the obligation to receive and facilitate monitoring and inspection activities", and Article VIII prescribes, "Each Party shall be responsible...for...disposition plutonium...taking into account...INFCIRC/225/Rev.4...". In accordance with the revised PMDA's obligation to dispose of an excess of 34 metric tons of plutonium, irradiation in fast reactors, irradiation of MOX fuel in LWRs, immobilization, downblending, and deep borehole options have been considered by the United States. In this research, it is examined how these options could be implemented from the nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear security perspectives.
Suda, Kazunori; Kokaji, Lisa; Tazaki, Makiko; Tamai, Hiroshi; Kuno, Yusuke*
no journal, ,
no abstracts in English
Tazaki, Makiko; Suda, Kazunori; Tamai, Hiroshi; Kokaji, Lisa; Kuno, Yusuke*
no journal, ,
In order to discuss possibility of safeguards termination of spent nuclear fuel from plutonium burners, difficulty of plutonium recovery from spent nuclear fuel from such burners was analyzed, based on IAEA Safeguards termination criteria and its basis for measured discards.
Kokaji, Lisa; Tazaki, Makiko; Suda, Kazunori; Tamai, Hiroshi; Kuno, Yusuke*
no journal, ,
DOE orders for Termination of Safeguards and graded material attractiveness was evaluated. As a result, based on the disposition experience through down blending, graded material attractiveness and its policy would be referred for Japan's case for the termination of safeguards.
Suda, Kazunori; Kokaji, Lisa; Tazaki, Makiko; Tamai, Hiroshi; Kuno, Yusuke*
no journal, ,
To clarify nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security measures for nuclear fuel cycle backend options including direct disposal of spent fuel, analysis of the nuclear material attractiveness categorization in the United States, difficulty in recovering plutonium from spent fuel and plutonium concentration and isotopic ratio in spent fuel were investigated.
Kokaji, Lisa
no journal, ,
It will be discussed the stuck problems and the future prospects relating with CTBT. And it will be evaluated the progress in the past 20 years.
Suda, Kazunori; Shimizu, Ryo; Kokaji, Lisa; Tazaki, Makiko
no journal, ,
no abstracts in English
Kokaji, Lisa; Suda, Kazunori; Tamai, Hiroshi; Tazaki, Makiko; Shimizu, Ryo
no journal, ,
This study discusses the safeguards and nuclear security requirements for disposition of radioactive waste including nuclear materials. This research examines how the US Department of Energy (DOE) evaluates and regulates the disposal of waste. In this research, it is ascertained that the categorization of the material attractiveness is determined by the relative effort required to convert that material into a device, and self-protection characteristics (radioactivity). This paper reports the result of the DOE's implementation of safeguards and security measures.
Shimizu, Ryo; Suda, Kazunori; Tamai, Hiroshi; Tazaki, Makiko; Kokaji, Lisa
no journal, ,
As to nuclear security measures against external threats to nuclear fuel cycle facilities, not only preventive measures against intrusion into such facilities, but also early detection of such intrusions have been implemented. However, considering current and frequent international terrorist attacks around the world, nuclear security measures against insider threats in facilities, including a system to determine the trustworthiness of personnel, have also been discussed and then going to be implemented. On the other hand, risks of insider threats in nuclear fuel cycle facilities have rarely been released in detail in the past. The authors have made a conceptual study on the possible occurrence of insider threats and their influence at each type of nuclear fuel cycle facility, from viewpoints of nuclear material types, processes and work methods of each facility.
Suda, Kazunori; Tazaki, Makiko; Shimizu, Ryo; Kokaji, Lisa; Tamai, Hiroshi
no journal, ,
The spent fuel of the plutonium burner reactors from nuclear security perspective is considered in accord with previous discussion of regulatory body on physical protection for low-level radioactive waste including plutonium.