Shibata, Ryodai; Yamazaki, Katsuyuki; Yamada, Hiroyuki; Miyaji, Noriko; Nakamura, Hironobu
Dai-42-Kai Nihon Kaku Busshitsu Kanri Gakkai Nenji Taikai Kaigi Rombunshu (Internet), 4 Pages, 2021/11
Physical protection systems (PPS) operated for security in nuclear facilities uses computer-controlled systems. If malicious peoples change program or install computer virus to PPS, they are invalidated. Due to insufficient surveillance etc., and then unauthorized removal and sabotage may be caused. This paper introduces efforts of necessary procurement and quality managements etc., for decreasing there affect, and their details.
Kono, Soma; Yamada, Hiroyuki; Goto, Atsushi*; Yamazaki, Katsuyuki; Nakamura, Hironobu; Kitao, Takahiko
Nihon Kaku Busshitsu Kanri Gakkai Dai-39-Kai Nenji Taikai Rombunshu (Internet), 2 Pages, 2018/11
no abstracts in English
Nakamura, Hironobu; Kimura, Takashi; Yamazaki, Katsuyuki; Kitao, Takahiko; Tasaki, Takashi; Iida, Toru
Proceedings of International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (Internet), 9 Pages, 2018/09
After the accident of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, to develop effective security measures based on the lesson learned from such crisis and to meet the IAEA Nuclear Security Recommendations (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5), NRA in Japan made a partial amendment of the regulations concerning the reprocessing activity in 2012. The Tokai reprocessing facility implemented all of those security measures by the end of March 2014. Those new measures help us to keep high degree of security level and contributed to our planned operations to reduce the potential risk of the plant. On the other hand, the trustworthiness program was newly introduced in 2016, based on the trustworthiness policy determined by NRA. The implementing entity of the program is JAEA for the Tokai Reprocessing Facility and is required for both the persons afford unescorted access to Category I and II, CAS/SAS, and the persons afford access to the sensitive information. Those who are involved this program will be judged before engaging the work whether they might act as insider to cause or assist radiological sabotage or unauthorized removal of nuclear material, or leak sensitive information. The program is expected as a measure against insider at reprocessing facilities, and is expected to be enforced around the autumn of 2017. As well as the establishment of security measures, the promoting nuclear security culture for all employees was a big challenge. The Tokai reprocessing facility have introduced several security culture activities, such as case study education of security events done by a small group and putting up the security culture poster and so on. This paper presents introduction and implementation with effectiveness of security measures in the Tokai reprocessing facilities and the future security measures applied to the reprocessing facilities are discussed.
Kimura, Takashi; Shimizu, Yasuyuki; Yamazaki, Katsuyuki; Endo, Yuji; Nakamura, Hironobu
Kaku Busshitsu Kanri Gakkai (INMM) Nihon Shibu Dai-34-Kai Nenji Taikai Rombunshu (Internet), 8 Pages, 2013/10
no abstracts in English
Shimizu, Yasuyuki; Yamazaki, Katsuyuki; Kimura, Takashi; Endo, Yuji; Nakamura, Hironobu
Proceedings of INMM 54th Annual Meeting (CD-ROM), 7 Pages, 2013/07
Japanese regulation of reprocessing safety and security was revised in March 2012, and almost all requirements except for nuclear material accountancy and control described in the INFCIRC225/rev.5 are included into the regulation. We have many things to do to meet the requirements within 2 years pursuant to the regulation. Separately from the revised regulation, we think that utilizing the process monitoring data not only for the safety control but also for the nuclear material security would be useful in establishing more effective and efficient nuclear material security. Since we observe the process monitoring data to confirm the operational condition including unusual change for the safety purpose, it is though that the various alarm information through the process monitoring data help to detect the risk of sabotage and unauthorized removal. As future challenge, we would like to establish a possible method of utilizing the process monitoring data in combination with the physical protection to make it possible to give more effective and efficient nuclear material security.
Makino, Risa; Ishiyama, Koichi; Kimura, Takashi; Yamazaki, Katsuyuki; Nakamura, Hironobu; Ikeda, Atsushi*; Yamaguchi, Katsuhiro*
Kaku Busshitsu Kanri Gakkai (INMM) Nihon Shibu Dai-33-Kai Nenji Taikai Rombunshu (Internet), 9 Pages, 2012/10
The Integrated Safeguards (IS) applied to JNC-1 site began from August, 2008. At that time, the inspection scheme was replaced from Interim Inventory Verification (IIV) with scheduled day to Random Interim Inspection (RII) with short notice in order to strengthen deterrent against diversion of nuclear materials. To satisfy the requirements for IS in Tokai reprocessing facilities including Tokai Reprocessing Plant and Plutonium Conversion Development Facility, we have cooperated inspectorates to establish remote monitoring systems, and to introduce RII smoothly. Though the new inspection scheme requires additional efforts which contain keeping a certain number of operators every day and declaration of interim inventory lists in a short time, the whole inspection days per year during inter-campaign could be decreased to about 60% by comparing with the conventional IIV. This paper reports the effects after introduction of RII and the future tasks to be discussed regarding RII during campaign from the operator's standpoint.
Nakamura, Hironobu; Yamada, Hiroyuki; Yamazaki, Katsuyuki
no journal, ,
In the computer system which is used in the nuclear facilities, it is required that runaway and/or invalidation risk caused by the terrorism by insider/outsider and/or malfunction by the bug etc. should be minimized in the viewpoint of nuclear safety and security. In order to maintain the safety, countermeasures for the supply chain risk, quality assurance system and information control for the physical protection etc., are introduced and managed in the life cycle operation. Especially, it is very important for the countermeasures for the supply chain risk. In JAEA, to keep the reliability in the procurement, we introduced the measures into the procurement control system. Since the surveillance system for physical protection consists of the computer system, it is necessary to manage the risk to be minimized. In this report, we introduce the necessity of procurement system and mechanism including supply chain risk as a good practice.