Kimura, Takashi; Tazaki, Makiko; Shimizu, Ryo; Tamai, Hiroshi; Nakatani, Takayoshi; Suda, Kazunori
Nihon Kaku Busshitsu Kanri Gakkai Dai-40-Kai Nenji Taikai Puroshidhingusu, p.85 - 88, 2019/11
This is the summary of research result of methods for denuclearization and IAEA verification after the denuclearization in South Africa. South Africa had developed and possessed nuclear weapons, and dismantled them including the related facilities and equipment etc. by itself secretly in the past. The method for the denuclearization and the verification is unique in the world. This report could give us the lessons to investigate how to denuclearize and to verify them.
Tamai, Hiroshi; Shimizu, Ryo; Tazaki, Makiko; Kimura, Takashi; Nakatani, Takayoshi; Suda, Kazunori
Nihon Kaku Busshitsu Kanri Gakkai Dai-40-Kai Nenji Taikai Puroshidhingusu, p.89 - 92, 2019/11
Libya's denuclearisation, named 'the Libya model', is regarded as one of good practices in cooperation of the international community and measures that have a sense of speed with the countries and institutions involved. Success factors of the denuclearisation are the Libya's relatively low technological progress despite the procurement of extensive nuclear materials and components due to the delay of detecting the nuclear programme, prompt implementation with the close collaboration of countries concerned, and Libya's cooperation facing to the economic sanctions and the regime collapse by the Iraq war. Precious lessons will be learned towards the prevention and the denuclearisation in other countries.
Tazaki, Makiko; Shimizu, Ryo; Kimura, Takashi; Tamai, Hiroshi; Nakatani, Takayoshi; Suda, Kazunori
Nihon Kaku Busshitsu Kanri Gakkai Dai-40-Kai Nenji Taikai Puroshidhingusu, p.93 - 96, 2019/11
Iraq, defeated by the Gulf War, had to accept denuclearization under UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687, but did not immediately and accurately report all its past nuclear activities to the IAEA. IAEA, as an internationally authorized nuclear inspection and verification organization to Iraqi denuclearization by the UNSCR 687, gradually revealed existence and the whole picture of Iraqi clandestine nuclear activities and verified destruction of weapon related facilities and equipment as well as removal of nuclear materials outside Iraq. Analyzing Iraq's characteristics of denuclearization could serve as a good reference for not only preventing nuclear weapons development but also considering their denuclearization in current and future states.
Tazaki, Makiko; Kimura, Takashi; Shimizu, Ryo; Tamai, Hiroshi; Nakatani, Takayoshi; Suda, Kazunori
Nihon Kaku Busshitsu Kanri Gakkai Dai-40-Kai Nenji Taikai Puroshidhingusu, p.81 - 84, 2019/11
South Africa had developed, manufactured, and possessed nuclear weapons, but later dismantled them all together with related facilities and equipment. After joining Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear weapon state and concluding a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), it started peaceful use of nuclear energy. In that sense, South Africa's denuclearization is one of good examples of past denuclearization in the world, although the South Africa's specific policy of apartheid had been deeply connected with its nuclear weapons development and denuclearization. Analysing South Africa's motivations for nuclear weapons development, incentives for denuclearization, and characteristics of its denuclearization could serve as a good reference for not only preventing nuclear weapons development but also considering their denuclearization in current and future states.
Shimizu, Ryo; Kimura, Takashi; Tazaki, Makiko; Nakatani, Takayoshi; Tamai, Hiroshi; Suda, Kazunori
Nihon Kaku Busshitsu Kanri Gakkai Dai-40-Kai Nenji Taikai Puroshidhingusu, p.97 - 99, 2019/11
Despite international accusations, Iran pursued uranium enrichment capacity. But through unprecedented strong economic sanctions, Iran accepted the restrictions on uranium enrichment capacity and agreed to accept the additional protocol. Nuclear program of Iran and nuclear deal are good precedents for denuclearization that has solved peacefully through multilateral negotiations, its process and lessons are compiled.
Kaku Busshitsu Kanri Senta Nyusu, 29(2), p.4 - 7, 2000/02
no abstracts in English
; Tanuma, Koji; *
Dai-18-Kai Kaku Busshitsu Kanri Gakkai (INMM) Nippon Shibu Nenji Taikai Hobunshu, p.103 - 108, 1997/11
no abstracts in English
no journal, ,
This paper investigates the essential elements derived from a case study that examined denuclearization carried out in the past in several countries like South Africa, to clearly explain the actual definition of denuclearization. Specifically, the case study was based on a research conducted by examining denuclearization-related official documents such as agreements, protocols, declarations, statements, national laws, and concluded resolutions and reports which were enacted and published by the respective Governments and international organizations. As a result of this activity, the relevant essential elements were defined and categorized. Through this study, measures to physically remove nuclear weapons and programs from these countries were defined and categorized into the following two elements: firstly, the disablement, dismantling, disposal, removal, freezing of nuclear weapons, programs, and activities; and secondly, the assurance to prohibit nuclear explosive tests. In addition, in terms of scientific and technical aspects of the denuclearization process, it also identified that the prohibition of the re-acquisition of nuclear weapons and programs could be a third essential element of denuclearization. Lastly, this study recommended measures to address concerns for the scientists, engineers, technical staffs who were involved in the country's nuclear weapons program, and the country's know-how on the manufacturing of nuclear weapons, including illegal procurement routes of nuclear weapon-related components. The following necessary actions are recommended: first, the measures preventing such technology outflow (e.g. re-employment of relevant individuals and export control); second, the application and implementation of the IAEA safeguards; third, the capacity-building support activities for the implementation of IAEA safeguards and strengthening the country's nuclear security; and fourth, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region.