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Tamai, Hiroshi; Tazaki, Makiko; Shimizu, Ryo; Kimura, Takashi; Nakatani, Takayoshi; Suda, Kazunori
JAEA-Review 2021-073, 19 Pages, 2022/03
JAEA-Review-2021-073.pdf:1.51MB
As a part of "Research on Factor Analysis and Technical Process for Achieving Denuclearisation", investigation on Libya's cases of nuclear development and denuclearisation, and analysis of its characteristics have been conducted. Libya had been suspected that dictator Qadaffi had an interest in the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) since early 1970s after his revolution. US and UK intelligence were focusing on Libya's situation; however, actual status was not revealed for a long time. In 1980s, Libya faced to economic exhaustion due to sanctions from the international community against Libya's supporting terrorism. Libya decided to abandon WMD development and its denuclearisation in early 2000s. Several factors to prompt Libya's decisions can be highlighted; economic sanctions; witnessing regime collapse of President Hussein due to Iraq War who aimed at WMD; revealing secret procurement of centrifuge equipment through the inspection of German-flagged ships by US. Libya's denuclearisation was rapidly implemented to prevent Libya from reverting to nuclear development through well-coordinated roles among main players, quick decisions by Libyan side, and warning effect of Iraqi case. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) played a central role in the verification of all related facilities and activities in Libya. Through safeguards activities beyond those permitted by Additional Protocol (AP), IAEA evaluated the whole Libya's nuclear programme. The denuclearisation was successfully completed by removal of nuclear materials and related equipment from Libya. It was also revealed that Libya's technological capabilities had not well developed to utilize procured materials and equipment. Libya's case is regarded in the international community as a good practice of denuclearisation. On the other hand, Qadaffi administration was overthrown by the democratisation movement that occurred after denuclearisation. It might be understood as a miserable end
Sato, Susumu; Tomisawa, Tetsuo; Hiroki, Fumio; Lee, S.*; Igarashi, Zenei*; Ikegami, Masanori*; Ueno, Akira; Kondo, Yasuhiro; Hasegawa, Kazuo; Toyama, Takeshi*; et al.
Proceedings of 1st Annual Meeting of Particle Accelerator Society of Japan and 29th Linear Accelerator Meeting in Japan, p.467 - 469, 2004/08
As a joint project of KEK and JAERI, a MW class of high intensity proton accelerator (J-PARC), consisting of Linac, 3 GeV-RCS, 50 GeV-MR, is under construction. For this accelerator, it is required to minimize the beam loss (typically, lower than0.1
1 W/m at the linac). To achieve the requirement, beam trajectory needs to be controlled with accuracy of some 100 
m. The first stage of the acceleration (up to 181 MeV during the first stage of construction) is done by linac. The beam position monitor (BPM) in the linac utilizes 4 stripline pickups (50 ohm) on the beam transportation chamber. In this paper, systematic calibration of the BPM is described.