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Umino, Yoshinori; Kato, Keisuke; Tanigawa, Masafumi; Kobayashi, Daisuke; Obu, Tomoyuki; Kimura, Yuichi*; Nemoto, Ryo*; Tajiri, Kazuma*
Nihon Hozen Gakkai Dai-19-Kai Gakujutsu Koenkai Yoshishu, p.33 - 36, 2023/08
In the basic laboratory of the Plutonium Conversion Development Facility in Tokai Reprocessing Plant, tests had been conducted to obtain effective data for manufacturing mixed plutonium and uranium oxide powder by irradiating a mixture of plutonium and uranium solution with microwaves. The test has already been completed, and we are currently dismantling and removing equipment. In this paper, techniques related to equipment renewal, dismantling and removal works inside the glove-box are discussed.
Mukai, Yasunobu; Nakamura, Hironobu; Tanigawa, Masafumi; Nakamichi, Hideo; Umino, Yoshinori; Fujisaku, Sakae; Kimura, Takashi; Kurita, Tsutomu
Kaku Busshitsu Kanri Gakkai (INMM) Nihon Shibu Dai-36-Kai Nenji Taikai Rombunshu (Internet), 9 Pages, 2015/12
When the unauthorized removal of nuclear materials (NM) from glovebox (GB) by an insider happens, it needs to be detected and reported immediately. In this time, for utilization of the security counterplan, the feasibility of a new detection concept for the unauthorized removal was investigated with implementation of several experiments considering actual GB operation. In general, the detection method using radiation monitor is thought of easily. However, it is very difficult to distinguish between authorized NM movement during operation and the unauthorized removal. To solve this subject, JAEA focused on negative pressure monitoring of GB, and investigated a new detection concept combining the neutron and negative pressure monitoring. As a result of the experiments in small-scale GB, it was revealed that this new concept had the capability to detect the unauthorized removal and to alarm to central alarm station rapidly, and had the possibility to enhance the effectiveness of the current physical protection measures.
Nakamura, Hironobu; Tanigawa, Masafumi; Mukai, Yasunobu; Nakamichi, Hideo; Umino, Yoshinori; Fujisaku, Sakae; Kimura, Takashi; Kurita, Tsutomu
Proceedings of INMM 56th Annual Meeting (Internet), 8 Pages, 2015/07
In the MOX handling facilities, many types and amount of nuclear materials (NM) that are relatively easy to access are used in a GB. In order to prevent unauthorized removal of NM from the GB by an insider, based on the Japanese regulation which was referred from INFCIRC/225 Rev.5, the 2 person rule are being introduced at the area where NM handling GB are installed. As an example of usage of the security counterplan for the detection of unauthorized removal of NM, a new proposal of detection concept for the unauthorized removal by operators were investigated with implementation of several experiments considering actual GB operation. In general, it is considered that normal concept is to use radiation monitor (
or neutron) to detect the event by checking the variation of monitoring data. However, it is thought that distinguish between authorized NM movement during operation and the unauthorized removal (sample bag-out from GB) is very difficult. To solve this subject, JAEA studied and proposes a new concept about negative pressure monitoring in the GB in addition to the radiation monitoring. It is thought that the hybrid monitoring concept between pressure and radiation provides the detection alarm for it with central alarm station (CAS) accurately and rapidly with high integrity, and helps to complement current 2 person rule.
Umino, Yoshinori; Sudo, Katsuo; Fujisaku, Sakae; Yoshimoto, Katsunobu; Seya, Katsunori*
no journal, ,
no abstracts in English