Amano, Tsukasa; Shibata, Ryodai; Sato, Yoshiharu; Yamazaki, Katsuyuki; Shiromo, Hideo; Nakamura, Hironobu
Proceedings of INMM & ESARDA Joint Annual Meeting 2023 (Internet), 6 Pages, 2023/05
In Japan, about 10 years have passed since the law obligated nuclear operators to develop and maintain a nuclear security culture. During this period, the global nuclear situation has changed significantly, and it is becoming important to maintain a stance that emphasizes compliance with regulations and nuclear security culture. In JAEA, the policy of legal compliance and developing nuclear security culture is determined by the president of JAEA. For legal compliance and developing nuclear security culture, many activities are carried out based on that policy. Finally, these activities are evaluated and improved it every year. Case study is the one of activities that can obtain skills for legal compliance and developing nuclear security culture, such as sensitivity of nuclear security risks, correct understanding of the laws. The procedure for the case study was created with reference to a method called KY-Training which is often applied to safety training program in Japan. KY-Training is a training that participants (groups) can reach the conclusion how to respond to cases through four questions. Firstly, participants are given illustrations and descriptions which has potential of nuclear security risks. Then, participants make discussion according to four questions. Consequently, participants can effectively become aware of nuclear security risks. In the 2022 case study, we prepared 23 cases so that they can select choose freely according to role of participants such as in charge of nuclear security, guards, general employees. Finally, participants are asked to fill a questionnaire to evaluate effectiveness of case study. The result of questionnaires indicated that the case study was able to lead to improvement sensitivity of nuclear security risks and correct understanding of the laws. Overall, case study results suggested that JAEA's efforts were implying sufficiently to develop and maintain a nuclear security culture.
Aoki, Rie; Shirafuji, Masaya; Nozaki, Teo; Akutsu, Narumi*; Miyaji, Noriko; Nakamura, Hironobu
Proceedings of INMM & ESARDA Joint Annual Meeting 2023 (Internet), 7 Pages, 2023/05
Amano, Tsukasa; Sato, Yoshiharu; Shibata, Ryodai; Yamazaki, Katsuyuki; Shiromo, Hideo; Nakamura, Hironobu
Dai-43-Kai Nihon Kaku Busshitsu Kanri Gakkai Nenji Taikai Kaigi Rombunshu (Internet), 4 Pages, 2022/11
About ten years have passed since the introduction of nuclear security compliance and security culture development activities. While there have been changes in domestic and international situations, it is essential for nuclear security that the entire organization maintains an attitude that emphasizes compliance with laws and regulations and nuclear security. JAEA has been effectively implementing various activities with evaluation and improvement. Especially, e-learning which combines education and awareness, case studies, and internal audits are considered effective in maintaining nuclear security compliance and security culture development activities.
Shirafuji, Masaya; Nozaki, Teo; Akutsu, Narumi*; Miyaji, Noriko; Nakamura, Hironobu
Dai-43-Kai Nihon Kaku Busshitsu Kanri Gakkai Nenji Taikai Kaigi Rombunshu (Internet), 4 Pages, 2022/11
In order to maintain transparency in the peaceful use of nuclear materials in Japan, it is important to appropriately respond to safeguards activities conducted by the IAEA/Japan. Failure to respond appropriately to these activities could have significant impacts, such as raising suspicion from the international community about the misuse of nuclear materials by not only the operators but also by Japan. In order to strengthen activities to appropriately respond to safeguards activities, JAEA has started (I) education on safeguards for all employees directly employed by JAEA, (II) lectures, (III) case studies, and (IV) standardization of procedures related to safeguards response since FY2020, following the methods used to foster nuclear security culture in the past. This report describes these specific activities.
INMMJ Newsletter (Internet), 3, P. 2, 2022/04
Based on the request form INMM Japan Chapter, I summarized the subject and suggestion about human resource development for nuclear security area. We are applied the hard law for the Nuclear security to keep public safe as well as safety. In the work of nuclear security, even if the research institute such as JAEA, as well as electric company, we must satisfy the nuclear security rules corresponding to each business regulation. The basic work is the activities of compliance and nuclear security culture promotion, insider/outsider countermeasures and emergency response, etc... However, in order to implement those works, high level of compliance consciousness and ability of communication are necessary. In addition to that, human resource development for nuclear security is not only the education for the person in charge of nuclear security management but also, we implement the education (e-learning) for all workers in JAEA. Furthermore, we implement education for the law, periodical review of our rules and assessment in order to reduce the security risk as low as achievable. Basically, I think that securing human resources and development of human resources is basic approach. However, in case of human resource development for nuclear security, not only the implementation of OJT and education, but also it is very important to conduct several activities shown in above continuously.
Shibata, Ryodai; Yamazaki, Katsuyuki; Yamada, Hiroyuki; Miyaji, Noriko; Nakamura, Hironobu
Dai-42-Kai Nihon Kaku Busshitsu Kanri Gakkai Nenji Taikai Kaigi Rombunshu (Internet), 4 Pages, 2021/11
Physical protection systems (PPS) operated for security in nuclear facilities uses computer-controlled systems. If malicious peoples change program or install computer virus to PPS, they are invalidated. Due to insufficient surveillance etc., and then unauthorized removal and sabotage may be caused. This paper introduces efforts of necessary procurement and quality managements etc., for decreasing there affect, and their details.
Sekine, Megumi; Matsuki, Takuya; Suzuki, Satoshi*; Tsutagi, Koichi; Nishida, Naoki; Kitao, Takahiko; Tomikawa, Hirofumi; Nakamura, Hironobu; LaFleur, A.*; Browne, M.*
JAEA-Technology 2019-023, 160 Pages, 2020/03
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has proposed in its Research and Development plan (STR-385), the development of technology to enable real-time flow measurement of nuclear material as a part of an advanced approach to effective and efficient safeguards for reprocessing facilities. To address this, Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) has been tackling development of a new detector to enable monitoring of Pu in solutions with numerous FPs as a joint research program with U.S. DOE to cover whole reprocessing process. In this study, High Active Liquid Waste (HALW) Storage Facility in Tokai Reprocessing Plant was used as the test field. At first, the design information of HALW storage tank and radiation (type and intensity) were investigated to develop a Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport Code (MCNP) model. And then, dose rate distribution outside/ inside of the concrete cell where the HALW tank is located was measured to design new detectors and check MCNP model applicability. Using the newly designed detectors, gamma rays and neutron were continuously measured at the outside/ inside of the concrete cell to assess the radiation characteristics and to optimize detector position. Finally, the applicability for Pu monitoring technology was evaluated based on the simulation results and gamma-ray/neutron measurement results. We have found that there is possibility to monitor the change of Pu amount in solution by combination both of gamma-ray and neutron measurement. The results of this study suggested the applicability and capability of the Pu motoring to enhance safeguards for entire reprocessing facility which handles Pu with FP as a feasibility study. This is final report of this project.
Kono, Soma; Yamada, Hiroyuki; Goto, Atsushi*; Yamazaki, Katsuyuki; Nakamura, Hironobu; Kitao, Takahiko
Nihon Kaku Busshitsu Kanri Gakkai Dai-39-Kai Nenji Taikai Rombunshu (Internet), 2 Pages, 2018/11
no abstracts in English
Rodriguez, D.; Tanigawa, Masafumi; Seya, Michio; Nakamura, Hironobu
Proceedings of IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards; Building Future Safeguards Capabilities (Internet), 6 Pages, 2018/11
Sekine, Megumi; Matsuki, Takuya; Suzuki, Satoshi*; Tsutagi, Koichi; Tomikawa, Hirofumi; Nakamura, Hironobu; LaFleur, A.*; Browne, M.*
Proceedings of IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards; Building Future Safeguards Capabilities (Internet), 8 Pages, 2018/11
The IAEA has proposed, in its Research and Development plan (STR-385), the development of technology to enable real-time flow measurement of nuclear material as part of an advanced approach to effective and efficient safeguards for reprocessing facilities. To address this, JAEA and JNFL had previously designed and developed a neutron coincidence based non-destructive assay system to monitor Pu in solution directly after a purification process. To enhance this technology for entire reprocessing facilities, as a feasibility study, JAEA has been tackling development of a new detector to enable monitoring of Pu in solutions with numerous fission products (FPs) as a joint research program with the U.S. DOE. In this study, the High Active Liquid Waste (HALW) Storage Facility in Tokai Reprocessing Plant (TRP) was used as the test bed. The design information of the HALW storage tank and radiation (type and intensity) were investigated, to develop a Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport Code (MCNP) model. Then, dose rate distribution inside the concrete cell where the HALW tank is located was measured, to enable design of new detectors and check the integrity of the MCNP model and its applicability. Using the newly-designed detectors, -rays and neutrons could be measured continuously at the outside/inside of the concrete cell, to optimize detector position and the radiation characteristics. The applicability as a Pu-monitoring technology was evaluated, based on the simulation results and -ray/neutron measurement results. We have found that there is a possibility to monitor the change of Pu amount in solution by combination of -ray and neutron measurements. The results of this study suggest a feasibility study into the applicability and capability of Pu monitoring to enhance the entire reprocessing facility handling Pu with FPs. In this paper, a summary of the project will be presented.
Nakamura, Hironobu; Kimura, Takashi; Yamazaki, Katsuyuki; Kitao, Takahiko; Tasaki, Takashi; Iida, Toru
Proceedings of International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (Internet), 9 Pages, 2018/09
After the accident of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, to develop effective security measures based on the lesson learned from such crisis and to meet the IAEA Nuclear Security Recommendations (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5), NRA in Japan made a partial amendment of the regulations concerning the reprocessing activity in 2012. The Tokai reprocessing facility implemented all of those security measures by the end of March 2014. Those new measures help us to keep high degree of security level and contributed to our planned operations to reduce the potential risk of the plant. On the other hand, the trustworthiness program was newly introduced in 2016, based on the trustworthiness policy determined by NRA. The implementing entity of the program is JAEA for the Tokai Reprocessing Facility and is required for both the persons afford unescorted access to Category I and II, CAS/SAS, and the persons afford access to the sensitive information. Those who are involved this program will be judged before engaging the work whether they might act as insider to cause or assist radiological sabotage or unauthorized removal of nuclear material, or leak sensitive information. The program is expected as a measure against insider at reprocessing facilities, and is expected to be enforced around the autumn of 2017. As well as the establishment of security measures, the promoting nuclear security culture for all employees was a big challenge. The Tokai reprocessing facility have introduced several security culture activities, such as case study education of security events done by a small group and putting up the security culture poster and so on. This paper presents introduction and implementation with effectiveness of security measures in the Tokai reprocessing facilities and the future security measures applied to the reprocessing facilities are discussed.
Rodriguez, D.; Tanigawa, Masafumi; Nishimura, Kazuaki; Mukai, Yasunobu; Nakamura, Hironobu; Kurita, Tsutomu; Takamine, Jun; Suzuki, Satoshi*; Sekine, Megumi; Rossi, F.; et al.
Journal of Nuclear Science and Technology, 55(7), p.792 - 804, 2018/07
Nuclear material in reprocessing facilities is safeguarded by random sample verification with additional continuous monitoring applied to solution masses and volume in important tanks to maintain continuity-of-knowledge of process operation. Measuring the unique rays of each solution as the material flows through pipes connecting all tanks and process apparatuses could potentially improve process monitoring by verifying the compositions in real time. We tested this ray pipe-monitoring method using plutonium-nitrate solution transferred between tanks at the PCDF-TRP. The rays were measured using a lanthanum-bromide detector with a list-mode data acquisition system to obtain both time and energy of -ray. The analysis and results of this measurement demonstrate an ability to determine isotopic composition, process timing, flow rate, and volume of solution flowing through pipes, introducing a viable capability for process monitoring safeguards verification.
Sekine, Megumi; Matsuki, Takuya; Tokoro, Hayate; Tsutagi, Koichi; Kitao, Takahiko; Nakamura, Hironobu; Tomikawa, Hirofumi
Proceedings of INMM 59th Annual Meeting (Internet), 10 Pages, 2018/07
In a reprocessing facility, it is necessary to develop a detector which can measure plutonium (Pu) content in the Pu solutions containing fission products (FP) in order to expand the application of Pu monitoring. In order to establish this technology, JAEA has studied a system measure -rays was utilized since it applicable for Pu monitoring. Ce:GAGG (Ce:GdAlGaO) scintillator detector can measure a wide energy range in a high-dose environment and has reasonable resolution. -ray measurements were performed inside of the concrete cell containing the High Active Liquid Waste tank at the Tokai reprocessing plant. In the spectra, the two significant peaks were measured by the GAGG above 800 keV and were considered to be from Eu-154. There -ray measurements will be combined with previous neutron measurements and both will be compared to MCNP models for future Pu monitoring technology. This presentation will describe the detector selection, the design system, the results of -ray spectral measurements and the applicability for Pu monitoring. This project has been carried out under the support of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) of the Japanese government.
Nakamura, Hironobu; Kitao, Takahiko; Yamada, Hiroyuki; Kono, Soma; Kimura, Takashi; Tasaki, Takashi
Proceedings of INMM 59th Annual Meeting (Internet), 9 Pages, 2018/07
Sekine, Megumi; Matsuki, Takuya; Tokoro, Hayate; Tsutagi, Koichi; Tomikawa, Hirofumi; Nakamura, Hironobu
Nihon Kaku Busshitsu Kanri Gakkai Dai-38-Kai Nenji Taikai Rombunshu (Internet), 9 Pages, 2018/04
In a reprocessing facility, it is necessary to develop a detector which is measurable plutonium (Pu) amount in the Pu solution containing the Fission Product (FP) in order to expand the application of Pu monitoring. To investigate rays which is applicable for Pu monitoring, Ce:GAGG (Ce: GdAlGaO) scintillator which can measure a wide range of energy at high dose and has high resolution (Target: High Active Liquid Waste (HALW)) was newly designed and developed in deal with aim for Pu quantitativeness. ray measurement was performed to the HALW in the concrete cell using the detector, and it was confirmed that high energy rays (9.5 MeV) could be measured and high energy rays spectra over 3 MeV without deriving from FP at the first time. In this presentation, detector design, results of ray spectra measurement, applicability evaluation to Pu monitoring and the future plan are presented. This project has been carried out under the support of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) of the Japanese government.
Kitao, Takahiko; Takeuchi, Yoshikatsu; Kimura, Takashi; Kojima, Junji; Shioya, Satoshi; Tasaki, Takashi; Nakamura, Hironobu
Nihon Kaku Busshitsu Kanri Gakkai Dai-38-Kai Nenji Taikai Rombunshu (Internet), 9 Pages, 2018/04
In order to ensure and strengthen nuclear security measures, an active cultivation of nuclear security culture implemented by both entire organization and individual persons is vitally essential. Tokai reprocessing facility has conducted various activities such as case study education and training, yearly posters and patrolling the site by upper-level management that all employees hold a deep rooted belief that there is a credible insider and outsider threat, and that nuclear security is important. These activities are conducted in order to establish the foundation of beliefs and attitudes of effective nuclear security culture based on the IAEA guideline. This report introduces our activities fostering nuclear security culture in Tokai reprocessing facility that the evaluation and the continuous improvement of bidirectional activities by both top-down from multiple management levels and bottom-up from individual employee, and our challenges need to be worked on for the future.
Matsuki, Takuya; Yamanaka, Atsushi; Sekine, Megumi; Suzuki, Satoshi*; Yasuda, Takeshi; Tsutagi, Koichi; Tomikawa, Hirofumi; Nakamura, Hironobu; LaFleur, A. M.*; Browne, M. C.*
Proceedings of INMM 58th Annual Meeting (Internet), 8 Pages, 2017/07
The Tokai Reprocessing Plant (TRP) has been developing a new detector from 2015 to 2017 for purpose to monitor Pu amount in High Active Liquid Waste (HALW) containing FP. It can make a contribution to an advanced approach to effectively and efficiently conduct safeguards for reprocessing facilities because it becomes available to monitor and verify nuclear material movement continuously by a new detector, which has proposed by IAEA. For the second step of this project, we conducted dose rate measurement on the guide rail installing in the cell storing the HALW tank and comparison between measured dose rate distribution and calculation result by MCNP simulation in order to investigate the dose rate distribution which is needed for shielding design of a new detector that is used for radiation (neutron/ spectrum) measurement in the cell and inquest on the monitoring position of the detector for Pu monitoring. In this paper, we report the result of the dose rate measurement in the cell, improvement of the simulation model which is cleared by comparison between measurement result and calculation result and our future plan.
Rodriguez, D.; Tanigawa, Masafumi; Mukai, Yasunobu; Isomae, Hidemi; Nakamura, Hironobu; Rossi, F.; Koizumi, Mitsuo; Seya, Michio
Proceedings of INMM 58th Annual Meeting (Internet), 9 Pages, 2017/07
Safegaurding nuclear material at reprocessing facilities utilizes sampling to verify the quantity and process monitoring to maintain continuity-of-knowledge to reduce re-verification. Solution Monitoring and Measurement Systems that determine the solution density and volume are installed at solution tanks, though this only provides indirect verification. To offset this safeguards limitation we propose measuring rays from solutions passing through the pipes and at the tanks to provide improved continuous monitoring and direct verification. This can provide both real-time flow measurements and Pu isotopic composition quantification through passive nondestructive assay. This concept was tested by recent experimental studies performed at the Japan Atomic Energy Agency's Plutonium Conversion Development Facility of flowing Pu-nitrate rays. This presentation will describe the concept details and analysis of using ray pipe monitoring as a capability for real-time safeguards verification.
Swinhoe, M. T.*; Menlove, H. O.*; Marlow, J. B.*; Makino, Risa; Nakamura, Hironobu
LA-UR-17-23474, 28 Pages, 2017/04
The Inventory Verification Sample system (INVS) has been used for IAEA verification measurement at the Plutonium Conversion Development Facility for MOX powder and Pu solution samples (measurement uncertainty: about 3-5%). If the measurement uncertainty can be improved (to 1%), it is expected that the range of usage can be extended and it could reduce the number of destructive analyses. In order to improve the measurement uncertainty for solution samples, we conducted three different types of calibration method that are passive calibration curve method, known- method and multiplicity method after optimization of detector parameter and sample position. In the range of concentration of typical solution samples, a good correlation was found between measured doubles and Pu effective mass in the three methods. Especially, the result of the conventional calibration curve method and known- method met our target uncertainty within 1% (22 hours measurement). Since it is thought that background singles change may affect measurement uncertainty, an additional shielding was installed around the INVS to reduce those effects. This shielding improved measurement uncertainty in known- method. The results with this shielding suggests passive calibration method and known- method could achieve the target uncertainty within 1% less than 1 hour measurement time.
Mukai, Yasunobu; Nakamichi, Hideo; Kobayashi, Daisuke; Nishimura, Kazuaki; Fujisaku, Sakae; Tanaka, Hideki; Isomae, Hidemi; Nakamura, Hironobu; Kurita, Tsutomu; Iida, Masayoshi*; et al.
Proceedings of 2017 International Congress on Advances in Nuclear Power Plants (ICAPP 2017) (CD-ROM), 8 Pages, 2017/04
TRP has stored the plutonium in solution state for long-term since the last PCDF operation in 2007 was finished. After the great east Japan earthquake in 2011, JAEA had investigated the risk against potential hazard of these solutions which might lead to make hydrogen explosion and/or boiling of the solution accidents with the release of radioactive materials to the public when blackout. To reduce the risk for storing Pu solution (about 640 kg Pu), JAEA planned to perform the process operation for the solidification and stabilization of the solution by converted into MOX powder at PCDF in 2013. In order to perform PCDF operation without adaption of new safety regulation, JAEA conducted several safety measures such as emergency safety countermeasures, necessary security and safeguards (3S) measures with understanding of NRA. As a result, the PCDF operation had stared on 28th April, 2014, and successfully completed to convert MOX powder on 3rd August, 2016 for about 2 years as planned.